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Abstract
The digital revolution has fundamentally changed social information exchange and
vastly increased exposure to the opinions of others. However, it is unclear whether
exchanging such large amounts of information benefits decision making. Exchanging
a moderate amount or aggregated forms of social information may indeed avoid in-
formation overload and foster better decisions. We performed experiments in which
participants were asked to estimate quantities twice, before and after receiving either
all of their peers’ estimates or the geometric mean thereof. We find that second esti-
mates were more accurate when participants observed all estimates than when they saw
their geometric mean. Using a model, we predict that accuracy improves most when
about twelve estimates are exchanged, independent of group size. Taken together, our
results thus suggest that to optimize collective decisions, individuals should receive all
decisions from a moderate number of group members, rather than aggregated opinions
of large crowds.
∗Corresponding author – jayles@mpib-berlin.mpg.de
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Introduction
Social information is a decisive component of human decision making. Most of people’s
everyday choices, whether picking a movie, finding the best school for one’s children, or
gathering information before voting in an election, are influenced by the experiences and
intuitions of others. On a broader perspective, social learning strategies, which consist in
using social information selectively, continue to play a central role in the emergence and
evolution of cultures and their startling diversity [1, 2]. Understanding the impact of social
information on human decision making is thus crucial for comprehending human behaviour.
Information technology has altered how people relate to information and how individuals
interact with and influence each other. People are more connected to each other than ever
before: social networks, blogs and websites, and the massive diffusion of smartphones have
made information and virtual others instantaneously available, anywhere and at any time [3].
Moreover, pervasive online recommender systems and social networks have considerably ex-
tended people’s exposure to others’ opinions and recommendations [4, 5, 6]. For instance,
when selecting a restaurant, a travel destination, or a hotel, the first thing one often does is
look at others’ ratings and reviews. This permanent exchange of social information, generally
mediated by digital interfaces, is likely to amplify in the coming years, with new generations
being born and raised with smartphones and the Internet. This brings about new challenges,
such as how to process so much information and make efficient decisions, especially given
people’s limited time and cognitive resources [7, 8, 9]. One issue of particular importance is
how to best exchange social information in human groups in a way that improves individual
and collective decisions. On the one hand, providing individuals access to all the available
information gives them more ground to make proper judgments, but at the risk of cognitive
overload [10, 11, 12]. On the other hand, aggregated information is easier to process, but
lacks potentially important cues about the underlying distribution of information (e.g., the
variance in a sample). Between these extremes, exchanging a moderate number of pieces of
social information may be valuable for enhancing the quality of decisions.
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Here we address this important issue through the prism of estimation tasks, a highly
suitable paradigm for quantitative studies on social influenceability [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].
We performed experiments in which subjects were asked to estimate a series of quantities both
before and after receiving social information from other group members. Social information
consisted of a varying number of estimates τ from other group members (τ = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9,
or 11), and two main conditions were tested: either (i) all τ estimates (“full information”
condition), or (ii) their geometric mean (“aggregated information” condition) were presented
to the subjects. Crucially, in the aggregated information condition, and contrary to previous
studies [19, 20], subjects were aware of the number of estimates used to calculate the geometric
mean.
Previous studies have analyzed the patterns of social influenceability and the conditions
under which social information exchange can improve estimation accuracy [13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
19, 20, 21, 22]. However, to the best of our knowledge, a direct and systematic comparison
of the effects of full versus aggregated social information, in interaction with the number of
estimates exchanged, on collective decisions in estimation tasks has been lacking.
We proceed in four steps. First, we present the results of an experiment comparing the
effects of aggregated versus full information exchange on individual and collective accuracy
in estimation tasks. We show that exchanging full information leads to improved collective
accuracy, whereas exchanging aggregated information does not. We did not find a difference
in individual improvements between both conditions. Second, we investigate the mechanisms
underlying these results. We show that the collective improvement in the full condition results
from subjects’ tendency to favor estimates that are higher than their own over those that are
lower, thus counteracting the well-known underestimation bias [19, 23, 24, 25]. This effect
is not observed in the aggregate condition, explaining the lack of collective improvement.
Moreover, subjects relied more on social information in the aggregate condition than in
the full condition, and increasingly so as they knew more estimates were involved in the
computation of the aggregate (i.e., geometric mean). Third, we present a computational
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model that reproduces the empirical results well, showing that the mechanisms observed
are key to explaining collective and individual improvements. Finally, we show the model’s
predictions for larger groups. We find that improvements in collective and individual accuracy
are predicted to be optimal when about 12 estimates are exchanged, independent of the actual
group size.
Experimental design
A total of 216 subjects (sex: 138 females, 70 males, 8 unreported; mean age ± standard devi-
ation: 26 ± 4, 17 unreported), distributed over 18 groups of 12 individuals, took part in the
experiment. They signed an informed consent form prior to participating. The experiment
was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the Max Planck Institute for Human
Development (ARC 2018/08). Each individual was confronted with 42 estimation questions
(see the list in the Supplementary Information) on a tactile tablet. Each question was asked
twice: First, subjects provided their personal estimate Ep. Next, they saw the estimate(s)
of one or several group member(s) as social information and provided a second estimate Es
(see Supplementary Figure S1). The social information never contained a participant’s own
estimate.
Social information was displayed to subjects in three conditions: (i) the “sorted full infor-
mation condition,” where τ estimates (τ = 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11) were presented to the subjects,
sorted by increasing values; (ii) the “unsorted full information condition,” where the τ esti-
mates were presented in unsorted order to the subjects; and (iii) the “aggregated information
condition,” where the geometric mean of the τ estimates was presented. In all conditions
the exchanged estimates were selected randomly, and in the aggregated information condi-
tion subjects were informed about the number of estimates used to compute the geometric
mean. Participants in each group only experienced one of the three display conditions (i.e.,
between-subject design). This was done to avoid the “leakage” of strategies and/or informa-
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tion across treatments. For instance, being exposed to the dispersion of estimates in the full
information condition may impact a person’s subsequent decisions on the integration of social
information in the aggregated information condition. The number τ of estimates exchanged
did, however, vary within groups.
The 42 questions were randomly assigned to seven blocks of six questions. Across groups,
the order of the blocks and the questions within a block were randomized. A block always
contained each number of estimates to be exchanged (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11) once. All
subjects thus experienced each level of τ the same amount of times. The randomization
was constrained so that across all of the 18 groups, each unique question was asked once
at each unique combination of display (three levels) and number of estimates exchanged
(six levels). All tablets were controlled by a central server, and participants could only
proceed to the next question once all individuals had provided their second estimate. A
30-second countdown was shown on the screen to motivate subjects to answer within this
time window, although they were allowed to take more time. Subjects received a flat fee of
e15 for participation and a bonus payment of e1 to e5 depending on their performance (see
Supplementary Information for detailed payment information).
Since both full information conditions gave relatively similar results (see Figures S2
and S3), we focus here on comparing the sorted full information condition and the aggregated
information condition. We refer to them as “full condition” and “aggregate condition” for
simplicity.
Experimental results
Because of the human logarithmic internal representation of numbers [26], it is more appro-
priate to consider the logarithm of estimates than the estimates themselves in estimation
tasks. Moreover, to make estimates of different quantities comparable, it is necessary to nor-
malize them by the true value of their respective quantities. We therefore use the quantity
5
X = log
(
E
T
)
as our variable of interest, where E is the actual estimate and T the correspond-
ing true value. X represents a deviation from the truth in terms of orders of magnitude. For
simplicity, we will refer to the log-normalized estimates X as “estimates”, with Xp being
personal estimates and Xs being second estimates (i.e., after social information exchange).
We compared the performance of groups when subjects received the full information (i.e.,
all pieces of social information) and when they received aggregated information (i.e., the
geometric mean of the pieces of social information). Following [19], we define (i) collective
accuracy as
∣∣Mediani,q(Xi,q)∣∣, where i runs over individuals and q over quantities, and (ii)
individual accuracy as Mediani,q
(|(Xi,q)|). Collective accuracy measures how close the me-
dian estimate X of all group members is to the truth (the log-normalized transform of the
truth is 0), and individual accuracy measures how close, on average, individual estimates are
to the truth.
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Figure 1: Relative improvement in (a) collective accuracy and (b) individual accuracy, against the
number of estimates exchanged, in the full (black) and aggregate (red) conditions. Positive/negative
values indicate that accuracy improved/declined. Dots and error bars (computed using a bootstrap
procedure described in the Supplementary Information) show empirical data. Dashed lines and
empty dots are model simulations.
Figure 1 shows the relative improvements in collective and individual accuracy after social
information exchange, as a function of the number of estimates exchanged, for the full and
aggregate conditions. A value of 0 implies no improvement (i.e., collective and individual
accuracy do not change) and 1 implies maximum improvement (i.e., collective and individual
accuracy correspond to the truth after social information exchange). An improvement in
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collective accuracy (Figure 1a) amounts to a shift of the median estimate toward the truth,
which is perforce accompanied by an improvement in individual accuracy (Figure 1b), as
individual estimates also get, on average, closer to the truth. However, there can be individual
improvement without collective improvement if estimates converge after social information
exchange, but without a shift of the median of the X (as shown in [19]). This is the case, for
example, when a single estimate is exchanged in both conditions (see Figure 1). Figure S4
shows collective and individual accuracy both before and after social information exchange,
to supplement the improvement thereof presented in Figure 1.
In the full condition, increasing the number of estimates resulted in increased collective
improvement (Figure 1a). In the aggregate condition, we did not observe such an increase.
Moreover, in both conditions, increasing the number of estimates exchanged led to higher
individual improvements (Figure 1b). Note that individual improvement in the aggregate
condition at τ = 11 was unexpectedly low, which is likely a statistical artefact due to limited
samples (i.e., noise). Indeed, collective improvement at τ = 11 in the aggregate condition
was also lower than expected (it should be close to 0, as also predicted by the model), and
thus negatively affected individual accuracy at τ = 11. Moreover, the error bar for individual
accuracy at τ = 11 after social information exchange (Figure S4f) points strongly downwards
(i.e., toward higher accuracy), suggesting that higher improvement could have been expected.
We next investigated the mechanisms underlying these results by studying the level of
social information use across conditions. We define the value assigned by subjects to the social
information as the weight S they give to the (arithmetic) mean M of the social information.
Note that the arithmetic mean of log-transformed estimates X is equivalent to the log of
the geometric mean of the actual estimates E. We define a subject’s second estimate Xs as
the weighted arithmetic mean of their personal estimate Xp and the social information M :
Xs = (1− S)Xp + SM . S can thus be expressed as S = Xs−XpM−Xp . S = 0 implies that subjects
keep their personal estimate (Xs = Xp)—that is, they disregard social information—and
S = 1 implies that their second estimate equals the geometric mean (Xs = M)—that is, they
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adopt the central tendency of the social information. Figure 2 shows the average value of S
across all conditions.
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Figure 2: Average weight given to the social information, against the number of estimates exchanged,
in the (a) full and (b) aggregate conditions. Shown are the values when (i) all data are combined
(dots), (ii) social information is higher than the personal estimate (squares), and (iii) social informa-
tion is lower than the personal estimate (triangles). Filled symbols and error bars (computed using
a bootstrap procedure described in the Supplementary Information) show empirical data. Empty
symbols and dashed lines indicate the values obtained from the model simulations.
Figure 2a shows that, in the full condition, subjects weighted social information more
when it was higher (squares) than their personal estimate than when it was lower (triangles).
This mechanism is known as the “asymmetry effect” and has been observed before [21]. Be-
cause individuals favor values that are higher than their personal estimates over those that
are lower, second estimates tended to shift toward higher values. Subjects thus partly com-
pensated for the underestimation bias, thereby improving collective and individual accuracy.
The asymmetry effect increased with the number of estimates exchanged τ , explaining the
increase in collective and individual improvements with τ in the full condition (Figure 1a).
In the aggregate condition, subjects weighted social information more the higher the
number of exchanged estimates (i.e., the number of estimates used to compute the geometric
mean). We call this the average size effect (Figure 2b). Prior research has shown that a
partial weighting of social information on average (i.e., 0 < 〈S〉 < 1) entails individual im-
provement, a mechanism known as the “herding effect” [21]. Moreover, the authors showed
that individual improvement increases as 〈S〉 increases, peaking at a value of 0.5, after which
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individual improvement decreases again. The increased weighting of the social information
up to 〈S〉 ≈ 0.5 in Figure 2b thus explains the increased individual improvement in Figure 1b.
Subjects did, however, weigh social information that was higher or lower than their own esti-
mate equally (no asymmetry effect). The absence of the asymmetry effect explains the lack of
collective improvement in the aggregate condition (Figure 1a). Subjects, on average, followed
social information more in the aggregate than in the full condition. One may thus expect
individual improvement to be higher in the aggregate condition than in the full condition.
However, this expected difference was compensated by the asymmetry effect, which was only
present in the full condition.
In the next section, we describe the agent-based model we built to test whether the
proposed mechanisms of information integration can indeed explain the observed patterns of
collective and individual improvement.
Models of social information integration
The models for the full and aggregate conditions are both adaptations of a model developed
in [19], which explains how individuals integrate a single piece of social information (the
average of an unknown number of estimates from other group members). It consists of three
key components which are also at the heart of the models for full and aggregate conditions
presented below. Figure 3 presents these three components, described in more detail below.
Parameter values are provided at first mention of each parameter.
First, personal estimates Xp are drawn from Laplace distributions (Figure 3a) for each
question, the center and width of which are the median mp and dispersion σp = 〈|Xp−mp|〉
of the experimental personal estimates, respectively. Because they are made before social
information is exchanged, personal estimates are by definition independent of the condition
and value of τ .
Second, each agent receives, as social information, the average M of τ personal estimates
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Figure 3: Main model components. (a) Probability density function (PDF) of personal estimates
Xp = log
(Ep
T
)
, where Ep is the actual estimates, and T is the true value of the corresponding
quantities. The green line is the distribution of experimental personal estimates, for all conditions
and values of τ combined. The purple dashed line corresponds to model simulations, where the
personal estimates Xp are drawn from Laplace distributions. (b) PDF of weights S given to the
social information. The numbers at the top of the panel give, from left to right, the probabilities
to (i) contradict the social information (S < 0), (ii) reject it (S = 0), (iii) compromise with it
(0 < S < 1), (iv) adopt it (S = 1), and (v) overreact to it (S > 1). The model distribution consists
of two parts: a Gaussian distribution and a Dirac peak at S = 0. (c) Average weight given to the
social information, as a function of the distance D = M − Xp between the personal estimate Xp
and the social information M . Subjects give more weight to the social information as the distance
increases. In (b) and (c), the data for the aggregate condition and τ = 1 are shown in red, and the
model predictions in purple. Different conditions and values of τ are not mixed, because both have
an impact on S.
from other group members. Note that this happens naturally in the aggregate condition, while
for the full condition, we assume that participants also adjust their estimates to the average
social information M , following previous findings [21, 27]. S is thus defined in the exact same
way in both models. After receiving the social information M , each agent then either keeps
its personal estimate (S = 0) with probability P0 or draws an S in a Gaussian distribution
of mean mg = 0.5 and standard deviation σg = 0.3 with probability Pg. The Gaussian
distribution encompasses the probabilities to contradict the social information (S < 0), to
compromise with it (0 < S < 1), to adopt it (S = 1), or to overreact to it (S > 1). The
overall distribution of S is thus composed of a Gaussian distribution and a Dirac peak at
S = 0 (Figure 3b). Since the distribution of S depends on both the condition and value
of τ , data from different cases cannot be combined, contrary to the distribution of personal
estimates. Figs. 3b and 3c each show one specific case: the distribution of the S in the
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aggregate condition for τ = 1 (to remain close to [19]).
Third, the average weight S given to social information increases linearly with the distance
D = M − Xp between the personal estimate Xp and the average social information M :
〈S〉 = Pgmg = α+β|D| (Figure 3c), where α is the intercept (α = 0.12 in the full condition,
and 0.2 in the aggregate condition) and β the slope of the linear cusp relationship (β = 0.1
for both conditions). This is the distance effect, described in [19].
On top of these three common components, one additional effect was included in each
condition. In the full condition, we introduced the asymmetry effect, built as a linear de-
pendence of 〈S〉 on τ , with a positive slope γ+ = 0.03 when D > 0 and a negative slope
γ− = −0.01 when D < 0, as suggested by Figure 2a: 〈S〉 = Pgmg = α + β|D| + γ± τ . In
the aggregate condition, we introduced the average size effect as another linear dependence
of 〈S〉 on τ , as observed in Figure 2b: 〈S〉 = Pgmg = α + β|D|+ γ τ , with γ = 0.022.
The probability Pg for an agent to draw an S in the Gaussian part of the distribution is
given by Pg = 〈S〉/mg. Then P0 is given by P0 = 1−Pg. Finally, an agent’s second estimate
Xs is defined as Xs = (1− S)Xp + SM .
Each simulation of the model mimicked our experiment, and the model predictions (shown
in all figures presented here) were averaged over 10,000 simulations.
As can be seen from the model simulation results in Figures. 1 and 2, both models quan-
titatively reproduced the empirical results, suggesting that they capture the key mechanisms
at play in the integration of social information in both conditions. In the next section, we
use the models to make comparative predictions about the full and aggregate conditions for
larger group sizes.
Model predictions
Figure 4 shows how the number of estimates exchanged shapes collective and individual
improvements, for groups of 50 individuals in both conditions.
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Figure 4: Predicted improvement in collective and individual accuracy for groups of 50 individu-
als. Model simulations showing the predicted relative improvement in (a) collective accuracy and
(b) individual accuracy, against the number of estimates exchanged, in the full (black) and aggre-
gate (red) conditions. In both conditions, collective and individual improvements are predicted to
saturate when approximately 12 estimates are exchanged.
The model predicts that collective and individual improvements saturate in both condi-
tions when about 12 estimates are exchanged. In the full condition, individual improvement
is even predicted to slightly decline when more than 12 estimates are exchanged. The sat-
uration follows from the constraint that probabilities (Pg and P0) must remain between 0
and 1, which imposes limits on the maximum and minimum average weight S given to the
social information (see Figure 5), according to the equation 〈S〉 = Pgmg. The asymmetry
(Figure 5a) and average size (Figure 5b) effects are thus bounded, leading to the saturation
in collective and individual accuracy, respectively. In the aggregate condition, the collective
improvement slightly increases with the number of estimates exchanged, but remains negli-
gible in comparison to the collective improvement in the full condition. However, when more
than 12 estimates are exchanged, individual improvement is predicted to be slightly higher
in the aggregate condition than in the full condition. Supplementary Figure S5 and S6 show
that we obtain qualitatively similar results for different group sizes.
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Figure 5: Saturation of the weight given to the social information. Model simulations showing the
average weight given to the social information 〈S〉, against the number of estimates exchanged,
in the (a) full and (b) aggregate conditions, for groups of 50 individuals. Shown are the values
when (i) all data are combined (circles), (ii) social information is higher than the personal estimate
(squares), and (iii) social information is lower than the personal estimate (triangles). 〈S〉 saturates
in both conditions when more than approximately 12 estimates are exchanged. Note that all symbols
overlap in (b) because there is no asymmetry effect in the aggregate condition.
Discussion
The ever-increasing amount of information available online raises two questions: would ex-
changing aggregated forms of social information improve decision making, as compared to
making the complete information available, and is there a limit to the number of exchanged
estimates that improve the quality of decisions? We compared the performance of groups
in estimation tasks, when subjects received either all the available social information or an
aggregate version of it (the geometric mean of the estimates of other group members).
Collective and individual improvements in the full condition were primarily driven by
subjects’ tendency to favor estimates that were higher than their personal estimate over
those that were lower (asymmetry effect), which shifted second estimates towards higher
values. Since humans have a tendency to underestimate quantities [28, 29, 30, 31], this
shift towards higher values is a shift towards the truth. This effect, originally unveiled and
discussed in [21], has a valuable effect on collective performance in human groups. The
authors argued that because people have “difficulties to reason about magnitudes outside
of human perception” [32], they may assess the reliability of relatively low numbers more
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easily than they would very high numbers, making them more likely to discard low estimates
compared to high estimates. A concomitant explanation is that people usually know that
the quantities they were asked to estimate are supposed to be large, even if they have a poor
idea of the actual value. It is therefore conceivable that people are more likely to assume
they have underestimated quantities than they are to assume they have overestimated them;
as a consequence, they are more likely to follow high estimates than low estimates.
Surprisingly, the asymmetry effect was absent in the aggregate condition, which explains
the lack of collective improvement in this condition. A possible explanation is that because
averaging smooths out extreme values, the aggregated social information would usually seem
reasonable, independent of whether it was lower or higher than the personal estimates. Sub-
jects thus could not differentially assess the reliability of the social information they received.
Moreover, subjects followed social information more (i.e., they “herded” more) when it
was aggregated than when it was fully displayed, and increasingly so as more estimates were
exchanged. Previous studies demonstrated that people are sensitive to the central tendency
and dispersion of estimates, and weigh social information more when the dispersion is low;
this mechanism is called the “similarity effect” [21, 27]. Since in the aggregate condition the
dispersion is zero, one may expect maximum herding. Note that subjects herded more in
the aggregate condition even when a single estimate was exchanged, although in this case
we expected both conditions to be equivalent. Since subjects experienced every level of τ
during an experimental session in the full condition, it is conceivable that the similarity effect
negatively affected the overall weight subjects gave to the social information, including when
a single estimate was exchanged. In other words, experiencing high levels of dispersion at
higher values of τ could, in turn, also reduce social information use when a single estimate was
exchanged. Moreover, the higher weight given to the social information as more estimates
underlie the aggregate reflects people’s statistical intuition that the reliability of averages
generally increases with the number of samples they are computed from [33, 34]. The herding
that increased with the number of estimates exchanged (in the aggregate condition) led
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to increased individual improvement (as discussed in [21]), but was not accompanied by
collective improvement.
To investigate the generalizability of our results to larger group sizes, we built and cali-
brated a model of social information integration based on the results presented in Figure 2.
We found that, independent of group size, collective improvement in the full condition is
predicted to improve sharply with the number of estimates exchanged, up to about 12 esti-
mates, after which it is predicted to quickly saturate. In the aggregate condition, however,
there was barely any improvement in collective accuracy. Individual improvement is pre-
dicted to saturate in both conditions when about 12 estimates are exchanged, with slightly
higher improvements in the aggregate condition. These results combined suggest that about
12 estimates should be exchanged and presented to individuals in large groups in order to
maximize both collective and individual improvements. Interestingly, this number, 12, is
of the same order as the “magical number seven, plus or minus two,” a limit in people’s
capacity to process information suggested by Miller in his seminal 1956 paper [35]. Although
these numbers should be taken with a grain of salt, it makes intuitive sense that processing
more than a few pieces of social information is a difficult task. It is important to understand
that this limit (12) is related the way people use social information (distribution of S and
strength of the effects). One may thus reasonably wonder if the way social information use
is distributed in human groups may have evolved in order to optimize collective decision
making, given humans’ inherent cognitive limitations.
It is possible that the parameter values describing social information use in the model
would be different at large group sizes when more than 12 estimates are exchanged, such that
the observed saturation values may be different from what we observed for a group size of 12.
Indeed, if subjects know that the aggregated social information they receive was computed
from a large number of estimates, they might weigh the social information more on average,
such that 〈S〉 might go beyond 0.5. However, even if this was the case, individual improve-
ment would degrade, since it reaches its highest value for 〈S〉 = 0.5 (as discussed above), the
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value obtained when 12 estimates are exchanged. This argument, therefore, does not change
our conclusion that about 12 estimates should be exchanged in groups for maximizing collec-
tive and individual accuracy. One may also argue that the model ignores potential cognitive
overload phenomena [10, 11, 12] when a large number of estimates are exchanged, such that
it may be inaccurate for large group sizes. However, the number of estimates does not matter
in the aggregate condition. Moreover, in the full condition when estimates are sorted, people
are expected to use the same strategy as when a few estimates are exchanged—that is, to
focus mostly on the central tendency of the social information, as shown in previous stud-
ies [21, 27, 36]. The model predictions should therefore be quite similar to what would be
observed in experimental conditions. The argument is more apt when the social information
is not sorted, but in this case, collective and individual accuracy are expected to degrade
rather than improve with increasing number of estimates exchanged, as people would be less
and less able to process social information properly. Therefore, even when social information
is not sorted, no more than about 12 estimates should be exchanged in order to maximize
improvements in collective and individual accuracy. Finally, if one imagines a situation in
which all available pieces of social information must be exchanged (and a substantial amount
of them), then it is likely to be preferable to present them in an aggregated manner. Indeed,
the main advantage of aggregates is that they free individuals from cognitive overload, inde-
pendent of the number of estimates exchanged. One can also presume that a critical number
of estimates exchanged exists, beyond which displaying aggregates yields higher collective
and individual improvement than does displaying the full information. This could constitute
an interesting direction for future research.
Overall, we have demonstrated that to optimize collective decisions in human groups,
providing individuals with all the decisions or opinions of a moderate number of peers is
better than providing aggregates, as people are able to base their decision on more than a
generalized tendency.
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1 List of questions
Below is the list of questions used in the experiment and the corresponding true values T .
In the original experiment, the questions were asked in German. Questions were a mix of
general knowledge questions and estimating the number of objects (e.g., marbles, matches,
animals) in an image. Images were shown for 6 seconds.
1. Marbles 1: How many marbles are in the jar in the following image? T = 100
∗Corresponding author – jayles@mpib-berlin.mpg.de
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2. Marbles 2: How many marbles are in the jar in the following image? T = 450
3. Matches 1: How many matches are in the following image? T = 240
4. Matches 2: How many matches are in the following image? T = 480
5. Matches 3: How many matches are in the following image? T = 720
6. How many gnus are in the following image? T = 483
7. Ants 1: How many ants are in the following image? T = 587
8. Ants 2: How many ants are in the following image? T = 672
9. How many herrings are in the following image? T = 939
10. How many ladybugs are in the following image? T = 812
2
11. How many flamingos are in the following image? T = 528
12. How many bees are in the following image? T = 976
13. What is the population of Tokyo and its conurbation? T = 38, 000, 000
14. What is the population of Shanghai and its conurbation? T = 25, 000, 000
15. What is the population of Seoul and its conurbation? T = 26, 000, 000
16. What is the population of New York City and its conurbation? T = 21, 000, 000
17. What is the population of Madrid and its conurbation? T = 6, 500, 000
18. What is the population of Melbourne and its conurbation? T = 4, 500, 000
19. What is the population of Amsterdam and its conurbation? T = 1, 600, 000
20. How many e-books were sold in Germany in 2016? T = 28, 100, 000
21. How many books does the American Library of Congress hold? T = 16, 000, 000
22. How many people died from cancer worldwide in 2015? T = 8, 800, 000
23. How many smartphones were sold in Germany in 2017? T = 24, 100, 000
24. What was the total distance of the 2016 Tour de France (in kilometers)? T = 3, 529
25. How many insured cars were stolen in Germany in 2016? T = 18, 227
26. How many cars were registered in Germany in 2016? T = 45, 071, 000
27. What is the average annual salary of a player in the Bundesliga (in euros)? T =
1, 456, 565
28. What is the average annual salary for players at Bayern Munich (in euros)? T =
5, 460, 000
3
29. What is the distance from Berlin to New York (in kilometers)? T = 6, 188
30. How many international tourists were recorded in France in 2016? T = 82, 600, 000
31. How many bicycles are there in Germany? T = 62, 000, 000
32. How many people identify as indigenous in Mexico? T = 6, 000, 000
33. What is the total length of the metal threads used in the braided cables of the Golden
Gate Bridge (in kilometers)? T = 129, 000
34. What is the mass of the Pyramid of Cheops (in tons)? T = 5, 000, 000
35. How much did the Burj Khalifa tower in Dubai cost to build (in dollars)? T =
1, 500, 000, 000
36. How many UFO sightings have been reported to the National UFO Reporting Center
since its inception? T = 90, 000
37. What is the diameter of the Sun (in kilometers)? T = 1, 391, 400
38. What is the distance from Mercury to the Sun (in kilometers)? T = 58, 000, 000
39. What is the distance between Earth and the Moon (in kilometers)? T = 384, 400
40. How many stars are in the Milky Way? T = 235, 000, 000, 000
41. How many kilometers are in one light year (in billion kilometers)? T = 9, 460
42. How many cells are there in the human body (in billion cells)? T = 100, 000
2 Computation of the error bars
The error bars indicate the variability of our results depending on the NQ = 42 questions
presented to the subjects. We call x0 the actual measurement of a quantity appearing in the
4
figures by considering all NQ questions asked. We then generate the results of Nexp = 1, 000
new effective experiments. For each effective experiment indexed by n = 1, ..., Nexp, we
randomly draw N ′Q = NQ questions among the NQ questions asked (so that some questions
can appear several times, and others may not appear) and recompute the quantity of interest
which now takes the value xn. The upper error bar b+ for x0 is defined so that C = 68.3 %
(by analogy with the usual standard deviation for a normal distribution) of the xn greater
than x0 are between x0 and x0 + b+. Similarly, the lower error bar b− is defined so that
C = 68.3 % of the xn lower than x0 are between x0 − b− and x0. The introduction of these
upper and lower confidence intervals is adapted to the case that the distribution of the xn is
unknown and potentially not symmetric.
3 Incentive structure
The performance P of an individual i was defined as:
Pi =
1
2
(
Median q
∣∣∣∣log(Epi,qTq
)∣∣∣∣ + Median q ∣∣∣∣log(Esi,qTq
)∣∣∣∣) ,
where i and q are, respectively, indexes for individuals and questions; Ep and Es are, respec-
tively, estimates before (personal) and after (second) social information exchange; and T is
the correct answer to the question.
This performance criterion measures the median distance to the correct answer—in terms
of orders of magnitude—over all questions, averaged over the two estimates (before and after
social information exchange).
The payments were defined according to the following distribution of performances:
• P < 0.3: e20
• 0.3 ≤ P < 0.35: e19
• 0.35 ≤ P < 0.4: e18
5
• 0.4 ≤ P < 0.45: e17
• 0.45 ≤ P : e16
6
4 Supplementary figures
Figure S1: Experimental procedure for an example question. The left panel shows the first screen,
where subjects provided their personal estimate. The question was asked on the first line, and
subjects could type their answer on the second line, using a keyboard that appeared when they
clicked on Ihre Antwort (Your answer in German). Subjects submitted their estimates by pushing
the OK button. A timer was displayed in the top right corner of the screen to remind subjects to
answer within 30 seconds. The right panel shows the second screen, where subjects could revise
their estimate after observing answers from other group members. In this example five answers
were shown (full information condition). As a reminder, the original question and the subject’s
personal estimate were shown. Subjects provided their second estimate in the same way as the first
one, with the countdown again set to 30 seconds.
l l
l
l
l
l
1 3 5 7 9 11
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
l
l
l
l
l
l
# Estimates Exchanged
Co
lle
ct
iv
e 
Im
pr
o
v
em
en
t a
Sorted
Unsorted
l
l
l
l l l
1 3 5 7 9 11
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
l
l
l
l
l
l
# Estimates Exchanged
In
di
vi
du
al
 Im
pr
o
v
em
en
t b
Figure S2: Relative improvement in (a) collective accuracy and (b) individual accuracy, against
the number of estimates exchanged, in the sorted (black) and unsorted (blue) conditions. Posi-
tive/negative values indicate that accuracy improved/declined.
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Figure S3: Average weight given to social information, against the number of estimates exchanged,
in the (a) sorted and (b) unsorted conditions. Shown are the values when (i) all data are combined
(dots), (ii) social information is higher than the personal estimate (squares), and (iii) social infor-
mation is lower than the personal estimate (triangles). The asymmetry effect (see main text) is
present in both the sorted and unsorted full information conditions.
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Figure S4: (a, b, c) Collective accuracy and (d, e, f) individual accuracy, against the number of
estimates exchanged, before and after social information exchange, in the sorted (a, d), unsorted
(b, e), and aggregate (c, f) conditions.
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Figure S5: Model simulations of collective improvement for different group sizes. Relative improve-
ment in collective accuracy against the number of estimates exchanged τ , in the sorted (black)
and aggregate (red) conditions. Independent of group size, collective improvement barely increases
with τ in the aggregate condition, and saturates when more than about 12 estimates (blue dashed
vertical line) are exchanged in the full condition.
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Figure S6: Model simulations of individual improvement for different group sizes. Relative improve-
ment in individual accuracy against the number of estimates exchanged, in the sorted (black) and
aggregate (red) conditions. Independent of group size, individual improvement saturates when more
than about 12 estimates (blue dashed vertical line) are exchanged in both conditions. Moreover,
the saturation value is slightly higher in the aggregate condition.
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